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Executive Summary
Cotton production and export have a long history 
in Uzbekistan. The production of cotton, also 
called “white gold," has long been a strategic cen­
terpiece of the economy of Uzbekistan, which 
ranks second among world cotton exporters. 
Despite the declared objective of the Government 
of Uzbekistan—a market-oriented transition and 
liberalization—the government has not loosened its 
grip on the entire cotton value chain, including the 
centralized setting of prices through the state pro­
curement system. This system focuses on implicit 
taxation of cotton producers, which represents an 
important source of government revenue. Annual 
cotton production targets set by the state call for 
cotton cultivation on more than 50 percent of 
total cropland.
This case study considers the pros and cons of 
cotton production in Uzbekistan. Since the coun­
try's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
revenues from cotton taxation have contributed 
substantially to developing the industrial sector, 
boosting the current account, achieving energy and 
food-grain self-sufficiency, and buffering domestic 
shocks in food and energy prices. Nonetheless, 
some argue that the state procurement system 
hampers the development of the agricultural sector. 
Often the payments for cotton hardly cover 
farmers' production costs, and the quasi mono­
culture of cotton production has adversely affected 
environmental sustainability.
The stakeholders of cotton production in 
Uzbekistan—the government, farmers, the textile 
industry, and the rural population—face several 
policy options for improving the economic and 
ecological performance of cotton production. The 
concerns of each stakeholder must be taken into 
account when choosing what policy measure to use 
for improving cotton production.
Your assignment is to recommend to the relevant 
stakeholders an appropriate policy or set of policies 
to ensure economic growth in the cotton sector, 
taking into account the trade-offs between the state 
and farmers as well as potential short- and long­
term effects of recommendations on the national 
economy, social security, and the environment.
Background
Uzbekistan, one of five countries in Central Asia, 
was the fifth-Iargest country in the former Soviet 
Union [FSU] and is the second-largest country in 
Central Asia. With an area of 447,400 square 
kilometres [km1 2), it is slightly larger than California 
and about the same size as France. Uzbekistan is 
one of only two double-landlocked countries in the 
world [Liechtenstein is the other). 1 With 27 million 
people in 2006, Uzbekistan has the third-Iargest 
population of the 15 countries created after the 
breakup of the FSU.
Agriculture forms the backbone of Uzbekistan's 
economy. This sector has long been a source of 
transfers from which the rest of the economy 
benefits. Of the total area, only about 10 percent is 
arable cropland, located mainly in the river valleys 
of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. Although 
small in area, these croplands produced 28 percent 
of gross domestic product [GDP) and 25 percent 
of national exports in 2008. About 60 percent of 
Uzbekistan's population lives in rural areas, and 
about 44 percent of the total labor force is 
employed in agriculture. Uzbekistan has an arid 
climate and is noted for its abundance of solar 
radiation, low cloudiness, poor atmospheric precipi­
tation, and high evaporation—factors that make 
irrigation indispensable for agricultural production.
Cotton production and export have a long history 
in Uzbekistan. According to historical evidence, 
cotton has been cultivated in what is now 
Uzbekistan since the 5~6th centuries [Rudenko 
2008). Today, the production of Cossypium 
barbadense L. and G. hirsutum L. [Ibragimov et al. 
2008) has a high economic priority [Muller 2006). 
Uzbekistan is the world's fifth-Iargest cotton pro­
ducer among 90 cotton-growing countries. It pro­
duces about I million tons2 of cotton fiber 
annually, which accounts for almost 6 percent of 
global cotton production. Moreover, during 
2003-07 Uzbekistan exported 4.447 million tons 
of cotton fiber [equivalent to 11 percent of world 
exports) and was the second-largest exporter in the 
world after the United States. Cotton generated 13 
percent of Uzbekistan's GDP and accounted for
1 A  doublMandlocked country is a landlocked country 
bordered only by other landlocked countries so one 
must cross at least two borders to reach a coastline.
2 A ll tons in this case study are metric tons, unless 
otherwise noted.
almost 30 percent of rural employment [Rudenko, 
Lamers, and Grote 2009], Cotton exports 
contributed to about 25 percent of Uzbekistan's 
foreign exchange revenues [Guadagni et al. 2005],
History of Cotton Production in 
Uzbekistan
The Tsarist Era: 1860-1917
Before 1860, the cotton belt region of the United 
States was the main supplier of cotton fiber to 
tsarist Russia. The U.S. Civil War hampered this 
export channel, and Russia sought alternatives to 
satisfy its cotton demand. Starting in the 1860s, 
tsarist Russia penetrated Central Asia because of its 
favorable climatic conditions and geographic loca­
tion. As part of the "Great Game" between the 
British and Russian Empires [Spoor 1993], railroads 
were constructed between main cities and commer­
cial centers in Central Asia and Russia. This 
construction inaugurated an era of regional specia­
lization, and the small independent states covering 
modern Uzbekistan—the Kokand and Khiva 
khanates and the Bukhara Emirate—were forced to 
become the main suppliers of cotton to Russia. To 
increase cotton yields and improve its quality to 
meet the requirements of the Russian textile indus­
try, G. Gipsitum varieties were imported from 
Central America (Rudenko 2008], In addition, the 
cotton area was expanded from 35,000 hectares 
[ha] to 441,600 ha, and the yield of raw cotton 
increased from 0.7 ton per ha to 1.2 tons per ha 
between I860 and 1913 (Spoor 1993; Pomfret 2002). 
The expansion in cotton area, which came at the 
expense of area sown to cereals, was due to the 
forced cultivation of cotton rather than to produc­
ers' reaction to improved terms of trade. In the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, one-third of total irri­
gated land in Central Asia was devoted to cotton 
production. Cotton was grown on the more fertile 
soils, whereas cereal cultivation occurred on less 
fertile soils.
The Soviet Era: 1920-91
Following the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, 
Central Asia became a part of the FSU. In 1924, the 
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [UzSSR] was de­
clared, with borders more or less matching those 
of current Uzbekistan. During the Soviet era, the
central government regulated agricultural produc­
tion and input and output prices. In addition, all 
supporting services for agricultural production, 
such as input distribution, agro-processing, and 
trade, were state owned and closely linked to the 
state procurement system (Spoor 1999).
The government of the FSU pursued cotton self- 
sufficiency and foreign exchange earnings much 
more than tsarist Russia had, and cotton was 
declared the "white gold" of Central Asia. Soviet 
investments in the UzSSR were almost exclusively 
oriented to the massive expansion of cotton pro­
duction: between 1913 and 1940 Uzbekistan's cotton 
area increased from 441,600 ha to 1,022,600 ha 
(Figure 1). To increase cotton yields further, the 
FSU government pursued the intensive use of 
machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides and the use of 
improved cotton varieties. Whereas before the 
1860s, what was then Uzbekistan had supplied less 
than 10 percent of Russia's cotton, from the 1930s 
onward the FSU became self-sufficient in cotton 
and even became an exporter in the 1950s (Pomfret 
2002).
In the 1960s, a new wave of massive expansion of 
cotton in the UzSSR was triggered by a specially 
designed irrigation program. Cotton area in the 
UzSSR increased by 23 percent in the 1960s and 
1970s and reached almost 2,000,000 ha in the 
early 1980s. After 1960 the land devoted to cotton 
constituted about 61 percent of arable land, and the 
level of specialization was greater than elsewhere in 
the FSU. Yields increased rapidly, and by the mid- 
1970s, official Soviet sources reported that raw 
cotton output in Uzbekistan was 3 tons per hec­
tare—the highest yield among all major producers 
at that time. Output reached 4.6 million tons of 
raw cotton in 1970 and more than 5 million tons in 
1980—10 times the output of 1913. Cotton became 
the engine of the economy of the UzSSR, which 
produced more than two-thirds of all Soviet 
cotton. As in the tsarist period, however, little 
attention was devoted to developing the entire 
cotton value chain in the UzSSR, and processing 
facilities and opportunities inside the country were 
not pursued. Uzbekistan remained purely a supplier 
of cotton fiber, which was processed by the textile 
industries in Russia and Eastern Europe. Cotton 
fiber was thus transported several thousand kilo­
meters for processing, and ready-made textiles 
were then transported back to the UzSSR.
Figure 1: C otton  Production in Uzbekistan and the FSU7 1913-2008
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The Transition Period: 1991-Today
When Uzbekistan became a sovereign state in 1991, 
the share of agriculture in GDP was greater than 33 
percent, followed by the industrial sector with 27 
percent. Concurrently, financing from the central 
FSU government ceased, and the Government of 
Uzbekistan (GoU] sought its own ways of gene­
rating revenue. Yet the former dependence rela­
tionships could not be easily replaced by the antic­
ipated focus on market-oriented production and 
international trade. A gradual market-oriented 
reform was introduced, and Uzbekistan has since 
pursued an "Uzbek model" of transition from state 
socialism to a market-based economy [Zettelmeyer 
1999]. This model consisted of a gradual reform 
designed to cushion the economic and social 
impact of the dramatic changes associated with the 
dissolution of the FSU as experienced elsewhere 
[Pomfret and Anderson 1997]. The agricultural 
reforms sought to maintain foreign exchange reve­
nues from exports [Rudenko 2008] because cotton 
brought Uzbekistan greatly needed hard currency. 
Following independence, the state procurement [SP] 
system remained a centerpiece of the national 
strategy largely because the national budget 
depends on revenues from the implicit taxation of 
the entire cotton sector [Guadagni et al. 2005] 
through production targets and determined
procurement and input prices [Pomfret and 
Anderson 1997]. Despite its relatively high place in 
world export and production rankings, Uzbekistan 
is a price-taking country in the international cotton 
fiber market, and the GoU exports cotton 
irrespective of the level of the world market price.
Despite its achievements in cotton production and 
export earnings, Uzbekistan's strict focus on the 
export of a single commodity, cotton fiber, makes 
the country vulnerable to world price fluctuations, 
particularly during periods of depressed world 
prices or dampened demand for cotton. On the 
other hand, Uzbekistan's economy benefits from 
increased world market prices for cotton as 
occurred in 2003/04  and 2007/08. In the after- 
math of independence, the input and output trade 
arrangements between Uzbekistan and other FSU 
countries became unreliable and were plagued by 
nonpayment by the FSU republics. Gaining self- 
sufficiency in energy became a declared priority of 
the GoU, which pursued a strategy of diversifying 
economic output away from agriculture and raw 
materials and toward the industrial sector. As part 
of this strategy, resources stemming from cotton 
and gold sales were used to develop import-substi­
tuting industries such as wheat cultivation and 
processing and oil refining [Rosenberg, Ruocco,
and Wiegard 1999], With the gradual diversification 
of the export sector, the share of cotton in 
national export earnings decreased and at present is 
exceeded by gas and gold sales. Nonetheless, the 
production targets and state-determined cotton 
prices remain a bedrock of the cotton value chain, 
and more than 50 percent of total cropland in 
Uzbekistan is still allocated to cotton production 
annually [Muller 2006],
Policy Issues
The State Procurement Mechanism
The market for cotton in Uzbekistan (Box I] can be 
expressed in a simplified partial equilibrium model 
as suggested by Pomfret (2008). Since indepen­
dence, the GoU has managed the national cotton 
market and purchased raw cotton from farmers at 
a centrally set SP price (Muller 2006). A center- 
piece of this state-ordered form of production is 
farmers' fulfillment of the targets set by the GoU. 
For instance, each year the GoU prescribes the 
areas to be sown to cotton and sets the total 
production target for cotton during a set of fixed 
procedures. First, the targeted output and area for 
cotton are set based on world cotton prices and 
markets and state budget requirements for the 
entire country. Next, these targets are allocated to 
the individual provinces and their districts, which in 
turn delegate these targets to farmers. In contrast 
to the common view that Uzbekistan's cotton SP 
policy is quantity based, in fact the policy is 
predominantly area and quantity based (Guadagni 
et al. 2005). The state fixes the size and location of 
fields on which farmers cultivate cotton and the 
yield target for farmers, which are set according to 
the land-suitability and soil-fertility indicator 
bonitet (Chertovitsky, Akbarov, and Yahshilikov 
2007).3 Based on these specifications, farmers 
cultivate about 60 percent of their farmland with 
cotton each year. To share responsibility for the 
risk that farmers will fail to meet these 
procurement targets, the state regulates farm 
management decisions by determining plowing 
dates and dates and rates of seeding, irrigation, 
fertilizer application, and harvesting. The state
3 The bonitet is a soil fertility indicator based on a 
comparative assessment of land quality and productivity 
with a representative level of agricultural activity using a 
100-point scale. Areas graded below 40 are considered 
to be marginal and of poor quality.
therefore plays a major role even in field activities 
(Veldwisch and Spoor 2008).
Following independence, a cotton pricing system 
was introduced to nominally increase incentives to 
farmers. At present, the SP price for cotton is 
established annually on the basis of the net world 
market price minus ginning, transportation, 
custom, and certification costs and taxes paid by 
intermediate participants (Rudenko 2008). Since 
independence, the GoU has gradually narrowed the 
difference between world and domestic cotton prices 
despite temporary drops in world market prices 
(Djanibekov 2008). But in 2001 the hypothetical 
border price of raw cotton was still 52 percent 
greater than the procurement price paid to farmers 
(Muller 2006). In 2003, the cotton price of 
US$200 per ton paid to farmers in Uzbekistan was 
still substantially lower than prices in Kazakhstan 
[US$550 per ton) and Kyrgyzstan (US$450 per ton), 
which abolished its SP system in 1990s (Pomfret 
2008). Because the SP price paid to Uzbek farmers 
is obviously lower than the world market price for 
cotton, it represents an implicit tax and is an 
im p o rtan t source of governm ent revenue 
[Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard 1999). To pro­
vide incentives to farmers to fulfill the SP target, 
the GoU introduced a "double pricing system" 
through which half of the SP quota of cotton 
could be sold either domestically or abroad at a 
negotiated price that is 20 percent higher than 
the SP price. This option becomes valid if pro­
ducers fulfill the procurement quota. Farmers often 
fail, however, to reach the high production targets 
(Veldwisch and Spoor 2008). Because the GoU still 
has a monopoly on cotton marketing, these 
changes have not yet shown visible results on the 
ground.
Land Tenure
The GoU holds exclusive ownership of land in 
Uzbekistan. Farmers are granted nontransferable, 
usufruct rights based on land lease contracts up to 
50 years, and they are prohibited from selling, 
mortgaging, or exchanging the leased land (Lerman 
2008). Furthermore, the state can cancel the land 
lease contracts with farmers any time, as regularly 
happens when farmers change their cotton cultiva­
tion area. On the other hand, farmers can cancel 
the lease contract any time if they do not see 
further benefits from its use.
Producer Subsidies
Special state subsidies are provided to farmers, 
particularly those involved in cotton production, 
for fertilizers, maintenance and operation of irriga­
tion systems, fuel, and machinery services 
(Bobojonov 2008). Additional subsidies are pro­
vided in the form of price differentials for cotton 
by-products, credit postponements, and tax remis­
sions (Rudenko 2008). For example, in 2004, the 
total subsidies to agriculture amounted to US$441 
million (Guadagni et ai. 2005). Most of these sub­
sidies were allocated not directly to cotton 
producers, but rather to the agricultural sector as a 
whole. For instance, subsidies for irrigation, which 
comprise the operation and maintenance costs as 
well as the state budget payments to irrigation 
pumping stations, amounted to 37 percent of all 
subsidies. The share of implicit subsidies to cotton 
producers was 33 percent of the total subsidies in 
2004. Only 8 percent of these subsidies to cotton 
producers were provided by the GoU as input 
price differentials. More than half of the implicit
subsidies were provided in form of targeted loans 
at a preferential interest rate of 3 percent, which is 
significantly lower than the market interest rate 
(Guadagni et ai. 2005). The targeted loans are 
offered to cotton producers through specialized 
state-managed banks, but they are in fact a direct 
state financing of producers where costs of and 
payments for producing cotton are virtual. For 
instance, the account of the farmer is directly 
credited and funds are transferred directly from 
the farmer's account to that of the state-owned 
input suppliers, even without instructions from the 
account holder (Veldwisch and Spoor 2008). The 
credit is automatically deducted by the banks after 
the account of the farmer has been credited with 
the payments for the cotton sales. Farmers' 
restricted access to their own bank accounts and 
thus to cash, along with fluctuating input prices, 
affect not only their profitability, but also their 
flexibility and openness to innovations and 
improved agricultural technologies.
Box 1: The Partial M arket fo r C otton in Uzbekistan
The market for cotton in Uzbekistan can be expressed in a simplified partial equilibrium model (Pomfret 2008). 
For the sake of simplicity, it was assumed that all relationships are linear. Based on the empirical evidence that 
Uzbekistan is a small, price-taking country on the world cotton market, it was assumed that the world demand 
Z> for Uzbek cotton exports is perfectly elastic at the world price F. Given the domestic supply S and the 
domestic textile sector demand D, the free-market outcome would be a situation of cotton production OQi, 
domestic sales O Q , and exports Q Q i at F.
When considering the existence of a pure double-pricing system in the domestic market, the state sets a 
controlled price F <  A'on a specified output OQ,, which allows farmers to sell their additional output at Py. 
The domestic sales and cotton production will then be at the levels as in the free-market situation (£) and Q  
respectively). The only difference between a free market and the double-pricing system is that the latter involves 
a tax rate equal to (A - F], which is transferred from the cotton-producing farmers to the state budget at an 
amount equal to P'GQF.
When considering a cotton market in Uzbekistan that diverges from the present pure double-pricing model, 
three distortions occur: preferential cotton prices for the domestic textile sector, subsidized inputs for cotton- 
producing farmers, and the state monopoly of the cotton-marketing system. The GoU purchases all produced 
cotton from farmers at price F. To support the domestic textile sector, the GoU sells part of cotton at F  < F  
and thus stimulates the domestic demand from Q  to £>4. The rest of the cotton quantity (represented by 
QQ k\ the GoU exports at F. As a result of the preferential cotton prices for the domestic textile sector, the 
state revenues generated by the cotton tax [F  - F] are reduced by the area P-'BCF. Part of this loss 
(represented by the area P'ACF] is transferred to the benefit of the textile sector. The rest (area ABQ, is the 
uncompensated loss for the country.
Due to the cotton tax, the farmers will cut back their cotton production from Oz to Os. To stimulate cotton 
production, the GoU provides subsidies to the cotton-producing farms [for example, through input price 
differentials] and shifts S  to the right (supply curve S \  Because all the output, however, irrespective of the 
fulfilment of the procurement target or not, is purchased by the GoU at F, the farmers cut back cotton 
production from its new potential double-pricing level, from Qs to Qi. Nevertheless, because of the subsidies, 
the farms' surplus increases by Q,MJQ&. The state revenues increase by QsGGQi, part of which [MKj] is in 
fact a part of farm surplus gained because of the subsidization and transferred back to the state budget. When 
compared with a pure double-pricing system, the current SP system in Uzbekistan reduces the export earnings 
of the GoU and the revenues of farmers and creates a deadweight loss to the nation of JG H  and ABC.
The Partial M arket fo r  C otton  in Uzbekistan
Pros and Cons of Cotton Production
Expansion of Infrastructure
The promotion of cotton necessitated a network of 
other industrial branches including machine-build­
ing plants, chemical facilities, hydroelectricity, and 
cotton-processing and textile sectors. During the 
FSU era, Uzbekistan used the centrally transferred 
budgets to establish an agricultural, industrial, and 
mining infrastructure as well as a social security 
net—for example, each citizen had access to health 
care and education [Pomfret and Anderson 1997], 
Cotton production also drew on agricultural 
science. For instance, in 1922, the Institute of 
Cotton Breeding and Seed Production was estab­
lished and developed into a major cotton research 
and breeding center, culminating in the release of 
numerous cotton cultivars [Ibragimov et al. 2008]. 
Moreover, social network and service provision in 
rural areas, such as hospitals, schools and kinder­
gartens, libraries, concert halls, cinemas, post 
offices, and food stores, were set up during the 
FSU period in every village to ensure efficient and 
uninterrupted cotton production in the rural areas.
Cotton and Economic Stability
Following the break-up of the FSU, cotton 
production as an internationally competitive sector 
of the national economy demonstrated the 
potential to generate important export revenues 
(Zettelmeyer 1999). The industrial sector had 
depended on linkages within the Soviet economy, 
which were severely affected by the breakup of the 
FSU, and cotton production was selected as the 
engine to cushion the domestic shocks (Spoor 
1999). Whereas most countries of the FSU suffered 
dramatic output declines following the breakup of 
the FSU, Uzbekistan did relatively well in terms of 
aggregate output because it managed to mitigate 
the collapse of the industrial sector and diversified 
the economy by combining state management with 
subsidies generated from cotton export revenues 
(Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard 1999). These 
revenues also relaxed the external financing con­
straint for the acquisition of inputs and capital 
goods that would otherwise have stopped flowing 
following the disintegration of the FSU (CDPR 
2008). Since the beginning of the transition era, 
export revenues from cotton have contributed to 
the strengthening of the current account, set the 
stage for self-sufficiency in energy and foodgrains,
and served as a domestic buffer against the global 
problems of rising food and energy prices (CDPR 
2008). As a result, Uzbekistan has avoided hyper­
inflation, never recording a four-digit annual 
increase in the consumer price index [Pomfret and 
Anderson 1997). Since 1996, consumer price infla­
tion has steadily fallen and positive real growth has 
resumed (Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard 1999). 
At present the country's export revenues are 
generated by gold and fossil fuels as well as cotton, 
making Uzbekistan's economy much less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in world cotton prices compared 
with the first years after independence [CDPR 
2008).
Implicit Farm Benefits
Even if the SP prices are below world market prices 
for cotton, Rudenko (2008) postulated that some 
farmers preferred this risk-averse strategy because 
they were guaranteed a certain price for their 
cotton and hence were less vulnerable to price fluc­
tuations. Cotton farmers benefit implicitly from a 
steady supply of agricultural inputs, such as ferti­
lizers and diesel, that the GoU guarantees especially 
for cotton production. Cotton-producing farms 
often illegally divert part of these inputs to the 
production of other crops (Guadagni et al. 2005). 
In addition, farmers that reliably deliver cotton can 
build sociopolitical capital that can in turn be used 
as leverage to acquire additional cropland and 
inputs or timely and sufficient irrigation water for 
their entire fields, including for crops other than 
cotton (Veldwisch and Spoor 2008).
The extraction of cottonseed oil produces various 
by-products, such as cottonseed cake and husks, 
which the supplier-farmer can purchase at subsidized 
prices. These subsidized prices constitute an 
important benefit because most feedstuff used in 
livestock rearing, such as wheat bran or maize straw, 
contains little crude protein but is rich in metaboliz­
able energy (Djumaeva et al. 2009). Mixing the feed 
diet with cottonseed cake that is rich in crude 
protein can improve the quality of feedstuff and 
subsequently the quality of meat or dairy products. 
Also, cotton seed provides inputs for the produc­
tion of many traditional commodities, such as 
refined cottonseed oil for cooking and laundry soap. 
Cotton stems are used as a combustible for cooking
in rural households. Finally, cotton is a melliferous 
plant, which also contributes to the expansion of 
apiculture to areas without a high density of plants 
and trees.
Taxation of Cotton-Producing Farms
Despite the fact that the input subsidies for cotton 
producers offset the implicit taxes to some extent 
[Muller 2006], in 2004 the share of net transfers 
from the gross income of cotton-producing farmers 
was 31 percent—equal to US$249 per hectare of 
cotton [Guadagni et al. 2005], Since then, the GoU 
has reduced the amount of subsidies to cotton 
producers. Furthermore, under the present trend 
of increasing input prices, the SP prices for raw 
cotton hardly cover production costs. In the worst 
case, they may even offset the profits from farming 
activities on cotton-free lands, which usually pro­
vide major cash earnings and thus options for farm 
investments [Djanibekov 2008],
Existing incentives are not effective at encouraging 
farmers to exceed state production targets. China, 
for instance, which has areas with similar climatic 
conditions as Uzbekistan, had an average cotton 
yield of 3.3 tons per ha in 2 000-04 , compared 
with 2.2 tons per ha in Uzbekistan (Guadagni et al. 
2005],
Soil and Water Degradation
The expansion of a quasi monoculture of cotton 
production during the FSU era took no account of 
ecological costs. Environmental sustainability was 
ignored in favor of a precipitous maximization of 
cotton production, which required the extensive 
development of the irrigation and drainage networks. 
The rapid expansion of irrigated cotton without 
thorough analysis of and investments in proper 
irrigation and drainage networks led to manifold 
ecological problems, which the newly independent 
states have inherited. The demise of the Aral Sea, 
the fourth-largest lake in the world in 1960, is 
probably the best-known example of the Soviet 
pursuit of ever more cotton production. During 
decades of unsustainable practices in the FSU era, 
continuous irrigation increased soil salinity to levels 
that endanger production, requiring a shift to 
more salt-tolerant crops. Yet cotton tolerance for 
salinity is one of the reasons why this crop is pre­
ferred over alternative crops such as horticultural 
crops, which are more sensitive to soil salinity. 
Other crops with a higher salinity tolerance than
cotton are often inappropriate because they cannot 
earn the same level of foreign exchange revenues 
necessary for supporting other sectors of the 
economy.
Stakeholders
The Government
The dominant stakeholder in the entire cotton 
chain is the GoU, represented by numerous state- 
managed agencies mandated with separate tasks 
such as planning the cotton area and harvests, dis­
tributing production targets among cotton pro­
ducers, monitoring agricultural activities, organizing 
input supply and subsidies, fulfilling quotas, and 
marketing cotton. The overarching objective of the 
GoU to maximize export revenues from cotton, 
which are then invested in other sectors, is an 
implicit taxation of cotton production. But this 
practice causes an overall outflow of value from 
agriculture. The SP price has been steadily increas­
ing, however, and as a result net transfers from the 
cotton sector dropped from 8 percent of GDP in 
2000 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2004, which 
amounted to US$203 million (Guadagni et al. 
2005]. Some studies showed that subsidies were 
worth US$441 million in 2004 and taxation of 
cotton amounted to US$644 million—only a 
moderate difference [Guadagni et al. 2005], Fur­
thermore, when the entire cotton value chain [plus 
processing] is included in such calculations, then 
the difference between taxation and subsidization is 
virtually zero (Rudenko 2008], Still, the transfers 
from the cotton sector to the state budget have 
played a crucial role in the ability of the GoU to 
cushion recessions, in contrast to neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which abandoned state 
intervention in the cotton sector as much as possi­
ble following independence but then faced substan­
tial problems in achieving economic stability 
(Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard 1999],
Farmers
Another group of stakeholders affected by the 
cotton SP consists of farmers, and not necessarily 
only those producing cotton. From a producer 
perspective, the system of cotton monoculture on 
a large part of the country's cropland reduces crop 
diversification, which in turn reduces the scope for 
income diversification and increases the risk to 
farmers' incomes. On the other hand, the SP
strategy secures supplies of inputs such as water 
and fertilizers first and above all for cotton 
producers. This strategy, however, adversely affects 
the production options and in turn the revenues of 
noncotton farmers.
Nonagricultural Actors in the Cotton Chain
Farmers are not the only actors in the cotton value 
chain [Figure 2). After farmers produce the raw 
cotton, it is processed, cleaned, and ginned before 
being exported or used by the textile industry. 
Other stakeholders in the cotton production chain 
are thus ginneries, the textile industry, including 
spinning and weaving factories, and exporting 
agencies. Because of the complex nature of the 
cotton value chain and the many actors seeking 
revenue, recent in-depth analyses showed that 
cotton-producing farmers in Uzbekistan received 
only about 66 percent of the world market price in 
2004/05 for their raw cotton, and the remaining 
34 percent was distributed among the service­
providing actors of the cotton chain, such as the 
trade companies, certification centers, customs, 
financial institutions, and the transportation 
network [Rudenko, Lamers, and Grote 2009],
The Rural Population
The majority of the population in Uzbekistan is 
rural, and agriculture plays a key role in their 
income generation. Yet large amounts of cotton 
export revenues are invested in the development of 
other sectors. This practice diverts rural incomes to 
urban inhabitants and provides only limited scope 
for increasing the incomes of farms involved in 
cotton production. The low consideration for agri­
cultural and farm work, combined with low remune­
ration, also drives labor migration to urban areas. 
This migration in turn leads to a lack of highly quali­
fied personnel, such as accountants and agro­
engineers, in rural areas.
From a social perspective, cotton taxation has 
provided resources for social assistance and limited 
the declines in health and education expenditures 
that other FSU countries have experienced 
[Pomfret 2000], The cotton sector provides jobs 
to a vast number of people employed in the entire 
cotton value chain. This value chain absorbs 
unskilled labor in rural areas, such as young people 
and those who are not qualified for work in the 
Uzbekistan's industrial or service sectors. It can thus 
be argued that the cotton value chain creates a
substantial level of social security despite the wage 
levels. A decline in cotton production, which may 
follow the liberalization of the cotton market 
according to Djanibekov [2008] and Bobojonov 
[2008], may require a rapid transfer of abundant 
labor to other sectors of the economy.
Policy Options
Agriculture in Uzbekistan offers many oppor­
tunities that can be mobilized with further incen­
tives. Although SP is an important instrument to 
ensure the availability of foreign exchange, the con­
tinuous success of cotton production is influenced 
not only by the SP system, but also by market- 
related factors such as input and output prices. It is 
likely that the GoU will maintain the SP system as 
long as it provides sufficient benefits to the 
national budget or until enough other sources of 
state revenue become available to make the SP 
policy less relevant to the entire economy of 
Uzbekistan. It can be argued that more market- 
oriented policies could also produce the level of 
revenues generated by the SP system. There are 
options for modifying and upgrading the SP policy 
in ways that could stimulate the growth of the 
agricultural sector.
Policy Measure 1: Adopt Advanced Cotton 
Varieties and Agricultural Technologies
Farmers in Uzbekistan produce on average 2.6 tons 
per ha of raw cotton, or about 0.85 tons per ha of 
cotton fiber—Uzbekistan thus falls in a range of 
average-yielding countries [Rudenko 2008], Several 
possibilities exist for raising cotton yields in 
Uzbekistan. Examples include drip irrigation, 
increased fertilizer-use efficiency through the use 
of subsurface fertilizer application, the use of 
improved or more salt-tolerant varieties, the intro­
duction of conservation agriculture, and the 
promotion of appropriate crop rotations. In 
addition, there are opportunities for introducing 
organic cotton production, although they are 
currently limited by the low availability of organic 
fertilizers such as manure [Franz, Bobojonov, and 
Egamberdiev 2010]. Genetically modified [GM] 
cotton is currently not cultivated in Uzbekistan. 
The GoU is concerned about the unknown long­
term effects on human and animal health [Rudenko 
2008], so feasibility studies on the potential for 
GM cotton to improve yields and quality in 
Uzbekistan have not yet been conducted.
Figure 2: The C otton Chain in Uzbekistan
Source: Adapted from Rudenko 2008.
Policy Measure 2: Improve the Structure of 
the Cotton Value Chain
The enabling environment of the cotton chain is 
shaped by various actors, such as the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Water Resources, Finance, 
Economy, Foreign Economic Relations, Trade, and 
Development, as well as organizations and institu­
tions such as UzStandart Agency and the 
Cottonseed Corporation. A shortening of the 
cotton chain, or a reduction in the number of 
monitoring and controlling actors in the cotton 
value chain, would free up the share of export 
revenues currently absorbed by these actors. If this 
revenue were then allocated to farmers, it could 
help them build up farm capital for investments 
[Rudenko, Lamers, and Grote 2009], It will take 
time to change the structure of the cotton chain 
and the mindset of stakeholders. In addition, 
stakeholders further along the cotton chain such as 
ginneries and textile factories would need to
develop additional skills, such as marketing, to 
become effective if the existing structure is 
eliminated. Moreover, privatizing and upgrading 
various main actors in the chain such as the 
ginneries could lead to the elimination of various 
intermediate agents and thus to lower transaction 
costs and higher returns to farmers.
Policy Measure 3: Further Develop the 
Ginning and Processing Industries
Currently almost all ginneries use outdated equip­
ment for processing raw cotton into marketable 
cotton fiber. Public and private investments in the 
local ginnery and textile sectors could strengthen 
the economic benefits from cotton production in 
Uzbekistan. State-run ginning in Uzbekistan is now 
less expensive than in many cotton-producing
countries. For example, in Uzbekistan average 
ginning costs amount to US$158 per ton of fiber, 
compared with US$549 per ton of fiber in Spain 
[Rudenko 2008], At the same time, the present 
level of losses at the ginneries in Uzbekistan is 
higher than in other countries, and efficiency is 
lower. Uzbekistan has a ratio of fiber to raw cotton 
of 32 percent [known as the ginning outturn), 
whereas in many cotton-producing countries the 
ginning outturn averages 39 percent, and in the 
countries of West and Central Africa the figure is 
40-43  percent. Modernizing the country's 
ginneries could improve ginning efficiency and 
increase the output of cotton fiber; it has been 
estimated that the cost of this modernization would 
pay for itself in about two years. Guadagni et ai. 
[2005] estimated that it would increase output by 
16 percent. A privatized ginning sector made up of 
many competing private ginneries would offer 
farmers the option of selling cotton at prices 
directly linked to the world market price and 
thereby increase farmers' incentives to boost 
cotton yields and quality.
Each year Uzbekistan produces more than I million 
tons of cotton fiber, part of which could be used 
at low transport costs by the domestic textile 
sector. Currently only 18 percent of cotton fiber is 
used for domestic value-added processing and 
manufacturing, so there is significant potential for 
further development of cotton processing. 
Uzbekistan has a qualified, low-cost labor force for 
the production and export of ready-made textile 
products. As Uzbekistan shifts from being an 
exporter of cotton fiber to a producer of multiple 
textile products, its economy will be less affected 
by the vagaries of a single commodity market. This 
approach will, however, require adjustments in cus­
toms regulations, taxation, and transportation as 
well as public and private investments in the 
industrial upgrading of local producers and 
subsequent upgrading of products. Uzbek cotton 
products could achieve greater competitiveness and 
world recognition if the industry could produce 
higher-quality products with greater "fashion 
content," develop highly demanded brands, deliver 
products quickly and reliably, and improve the 
sustainability and safety of industrial systems for 
the environment and the employees.
An increase in local textile production would allow 
Uzbekistan to earn the same revenues while reduc­
ing land and water use for cotton production by
more than two-thirds [Rudenko 2008). This change 
would allow for intensification of cotton produc­
tion in favorable locations and permit less fertile 
and marginal soils to be retired or used for another 
purpose. Reduced use of water for cotton would 
lower the risk of water shortages due to climate 
change.
Policy Measure 4: Modify the Cotton 
Procurement Mechanism
This policy measure aims at adjusting the current 
state targets for cotton, which are based on prede­
termined outputs from predetermined areas. One 
approach is to relax the influence of the national 
administration over land use and ease state direc­
tives on input applications. This approach would 
retain the SP system but shift from an area-based 
to a quantity-based system in which farmers would 
still need to produce the required amount of 
cotton. A farther-reaching alternative would be to 
fix a lump amount of cotton to be produced over 
several years instead of setting the production 
targets annually—for example, farmers would need 
to produce a fixed amount of cotton for the state 
over three years. Both modifications of the SP 
policy would offer farmers the option of cultivating 
different crops with higher profits if they managed 
to fulfill the production target for cotton using less 
land. The main prerequisite for both modifications 
is that farmers be free to decide on crop manage­
ment techniques; if they are not, the modified pro­
curement mechanism would not cause the antic­
ipated increase in productivity and farmers would 
fail to deliver the assigned targets. In addition, this 
approach would allow farmers to introduce crop 
rotations for improving soil fertility. Little inter­
ference in farmers' production decisions was the 
key element in China's agricultural growth in the 
early 1980s, although farmers still had to sell a part 
of their output at state-determined prices [Pomfret 
2000). This approach is not without risks, how­
ever, including an ever-increasing application of 
fertilizer to reduce cultivated area and increase 
cotton production.
Another option consists of extreme reform, such 
as a complete liberalization of the cotton sector 
where cotton marketing and exports are liberalized 
and cotton production depends entirely on pro­
ducer decisions. If the state-determined area and 
output targets for cotton cultivation were 
removed, farmers could independently decide
which crops to grow and where to sell [Box 1], If 
farmers were released from procurement targets, 
however, cotton area could decline as farmers 
expand the cultivation of other crops such as rice, 
vegetables, and melons, which are more profitable 
and currently restrained by cotton production 
[Bobojonov 2008]. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that gross farm income would increase at the 
expense of higher demand for water because more 
farmers could choose the most profitable and 
water-intensive cropping activity—rice cultivation— 
which may cause serious problems in Uzbekistan 
[Djanibekov 2008]. Under this scenario, the state 
would need to pay more attention to improving 
farm support services such as credit institutions 
and fertilizer, pesticide, and equipment suppliers, as 
well as creating incentives, such as water pricing, so 
that removal of the SP system would not threaten 
sustainable farm development by leading to the 
overuse of particular inputs like water.
A shift from implicit taxation of cotton producers 
to direct taxation—for example, through water 
charges and increased land tax—together with 
reforms of the procurement and input supply sys­
tems, can guarantee an overall increase in the direct 
tax flows to the state budget [Guadagni et al. 
2005]. Possible losses of export revenue from a 
liberalized cotton market can be prevented if the 
government imposes export taxes in dollars on 
Uzbek companies involved in exporting agricultural 
commodities.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend to the relevant 
stakeholders an appropriate policy or set of policies 
to ensure economic growth in the cotton sector, 
taking into account the trade-offs between the state 
and farmers as well as potential short- and long­
term effects of recommendations on the national 
economy, social security, and the environment.
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